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RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICATION AND CITATION 
OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REASSESSMENT 
Robert J. Martineau* 
In response to the "crisis of volume," state and federal appellate 
courts have been restricting the opinions they write to those 
opinions which will: (1) establish a new. rule of law or expand, 
alter, or modify an existing rule; (2) involve a legal issue of con-
tinuing public interest; (3) criticize existing law; or (4) resolve a 
confiict of authority. All other opinions are limited to brief state-
ments of the reasons for the decision, go unpublished, and 
generally carry a prohibition against their being cited as prece-
dent. Recently, critics have alleged a number of faults with this 
practice, including the supposed loss of judicial accountability, 
the difficulties of appellate review, the problems of predicting 
precedential value, the inequalities of parties' access to un-
published opinions, and the illusory nature of the claims of judi-
cial and litigant economy. In this Article, Professor Martineau 
demonstrates that these criticisms are based on false premises 
and ignore the realities of legal research and the appellate 
decision making process. Professor Martineau writes that limited 
publication and citation rules are an essential way to respond to 
increasing caseloads, so long as: (1) they are crafted and ad-
ministered to ensure that the criteria for publication are main-
tained with several checks on judges' discretion not to publish 
and (2) the prohibitions against citing unpublished opinions be 
enforced strictly through good example, sanctions, and structural 
mechanisms intended to make the opinions available less readily 
to people other than the immediate parties. 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase "crisis of volume" is a trite but nonetheless 
accurate description of the principal cause of the problems 
confronting the appellate justice system in the United States. 
Responses to the crisis have ranged from new structures, 
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such as establishing intermediate appellate courts, to new 
equipment, such as prov1.ding judges and law clerks with 
word processors and computer terminals. The appellate 
courts themselves also have made major changes in how they 
function. Some of the most common and most controversial 
changes concern judicial opinions. In some cases judges do 
not write an opinion. If they do write one, then they make it 
shorter than a full opinion and designate it as "not for 
publication." An unpublished opinion usually carries a pro-
hibition against its being cited as precedent. 
Although a few commentators have criticized the restric-
tions on publication and citation from the beginning, in the 
past decade commentators have been nearly unanimous in 
calling for their repeal, arguing that they are both fundamen-
tally flawed in concept and unworkable in practice.1 . . 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the validity of 
publication and citation restrictions in light of the criticisms 
of them and the increased numbers of unpublished opinions 
included in computer databases. Part I reviews the reasons 
given originally for the adoption of the restrictions: the time 
and expense involved in preparing, publishing, and researching 
full opinions. Part II summarizes and critiques the principal 
criticisms of the restrictions: the supposed loss of judicial 
accountability, the difficulties of appellate review, the problems 
of predicting precedential value, inequalities of access to 
unpublished opinions, and the illusory claims of judicial and 
litigant economy. This Article demonstrates that the crit-
icisms are based on false premises and ignore the realities of 
legal research and the appellate decision making process. It 
argues that eliminating the restrictions would create 
problems far worse than those attributed to their existence. 
Finally, Part III identifies problems that exist with the 
restrictions, examines their causes, and proposes remedies 
that will enhance rather than weaken their effectiveness. 
This Article concludes that although there are several weak-
nesses in the· administration of rules restricting citation and 
publication of judicial opinions, the rules should not be 
eliminated. Rather, several changes should be made to 
provide for improved administration of the rules. 
1. See infra note 39 for a compilation of the articles participating in the 
debate. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
PUBLICATION AND CITATION OF OPINIONS 
A. Early Commentary 
Although restrictions on the publication and citation of 
judicial opinions did not become widespread until the last 
two decades, calls for a reduction in the number of opinions 
added to the body of common-law precedent are nothing new. 
Faced with roughly thirty volumes of reported decisions in 
1777, England's Lord Coke warned judges not to report all 
decisions.2 Similar concerns about the growing wealth of case 
law appeared on this side of the Atlantic Ocean as early as 
1915.3 It was not until the early 1970s, however, that judges, 
scholars, and attorneys in the United States embarked on a 
serious effort to reduce the growing body of reported case law 
facing the bar and the bench. 
Initial discussion of curtailing publication stemmed from a 
concern for maintaining a manageable body of law in light of 
the growing number of cases heard by appellate courts. _The 
Judicial Conference of the United States first took note of the 
problem in 1964, recommending that federal courts authorize 
2. 2 Coke's Rep. iii-iv (1777). 
3. See Maurice A. Young, The Unofficially Reported Case as Authority, 1 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 135, 136--37 (1935) (tracing the history and use in Ohio of both officially 
and unofficially reported cases and noting that in 1915 attorneys complained of 
unequal access to the latter). For other early literature addressing the proliferation 
of published or unpublished opinions, see also James M. Flavin, Decisions and 
Opinions for Publication, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 137 (1960) (calling for limited 
publication of the memoranda decisions of New York's Appellate Division); 
Opinions of Courts: Should Number Published Be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668 (1948) 
(summarizing a committee report to the Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which recommended a 
reduction of the number of published opinions and enumerated guiding principles 
on which to base the publication decision); Maurice Saeta, What Price Written 
Opinions!, 9 CAL. ST. B.J. 222, 222 (1934) (observing the growing number of 
opinions produced yearly and noting that "in an 'era of plenty' of written opinions 
there is a 'want' of good opinions [as] [y]ou cannot have quality with mass produc-
tion"); id. at 223 (calling for procedural reform); Glenn R. Winters, Reducing the 
Volume of Published Opinions, 20 FLA. L.J. 250, 251 (1946) (commenting on the 
possibility of discontinuing publication of opinions "involving no new point of law"); 
id. at 252-53 (addressing who would make the publication decision); id. at 253 
(questioning whether opinions, as public property, can be suppressed through judi-
cial mandate). 
122 University of Mkhigan Journal of Law &form [VOL. 28:1 
"the publication of only those opinions which are of general 
precedential value."4 
B. The 1973 Advisory Council for Appellate Justice Report 
Little happened until 1973, when the Advisory Council for 
Appellate Justice issued a report urging appellate courts to 
adopt publication rules to reduce the number of published 
appellate opinions.5 In proposing limited publication, the 
Advisory Council report identifies several principal concerns. 
Limited publication could "help redress the balance between 
what must be produced and assimilated and the resources 
available for production and assimilation."6 In contrast, the 
continuation of unlimited publication threatened to "crush[] 
[the common law of the United States] by its own weight if 
the rate of publication [was] not abated."7 
1. Benefits of Limited Publication-The report identifies 
the benefits to be gained from limited publication: saving the 
judge and the appellate court bench the tim"e spent preparing 
a polished, published opinion;8 saving the lawyer the time 
spent researching opinions;9 reducing the logistical burden and 
expense of maintaining a law library;10 reducing the burden on 
publishing companies to supply the increasing number of 
opinions at affordable rates;11 and reducing the burden on the 
entire system of creating new devices to point the bar and the 
bench to the opinions constituting precedent.12 
4. 1964 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 11 [hereinafter 1964 REPORT] (reporting a resolution approved by 
the Conference). 
5. COMMITl'EE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL 
FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PuBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 1 
(1973) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES]. The Council had 
31members,18 of whom were federal and state judges. See id. at inside front cover. 
Some of the most prominent were Roger Traynor, Griffin Bell, Walter Schaefer, 
Shirley Hufstedler, and Carl McGowan. Id. The Federal Judicial Center and the 
National Center for State Courts jointly sponsored the Council. Id. at preface. 
6. Id. at 6. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 6-7. 
9. Id. at 7. 
10. Id. at 8. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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2. Purposes of Judicial Opinions-After distinguishing as 
two separate inquiries whether an opinion should be written 
and whether an opinion should be published, 13 the report 
lists three purposes for judicial opinions. First, an opinion 
permits the parties and their attorneys to see that the judges 
have considered their arguments and have provided a 
·reasoned justification for the decision.14 Second, the process 
of writing an opinion can force judges to clarify their think-
ing. "[T]hinking is disciplined by the process of written ex-
pression," because "[t]he reduction of ideas to paper" allows 
for the exposure and correction of error. 15 Third, certain 
judicial opinions "provide the stuff of the law. "16 They 
facilitate the "understanding of legal doctrine"17 and its ap-
plicability to current conditions by providing a look at the 
court's reasoning, and they teach people in society what 
actions conform to the law.18 They help not only the litigants, 
but also other citizens, public officials, and lawyers, and thus 
should be disseminated widely. 19 
Not all opinions, however, serve this third purpose. Only 
those that do clarify or expand the law, as opposed to those 
that only settle disputes, deserve publication.20 A written 
opinion not designed for publication would require less 
refinement, polish, and time spent by the writing judge,21 yet 
could still serve the first two purposes of an opinion. 
3. Proposals-The report recommends that the courts 
adopt rules under which courts would: (1) continue to write 
an opinion in every case; (2) establish standards for publica-
tion and procedures to determine whether an opinion should 
be published; and (3) prohibit citation of unpublished 
opinions. The report proposes several criteria for the rules. 
First, to ensure consistency within a judicial system, the 
highest court of each jurisdiction should promulgate rules 
governing publication and citation rather than let each court 
design its own plan. 22 Second, "to avoid wasted effort," a 
13. Id. at 2-3. 
14. Id. at 2. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. · Id. 
18. Id. at 2-3. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. at 15-17. 
21. See id. at 5. 
22. See id. at 9. 
124 University of Michigan Joumal, of Law &form [VOL. 28:1 
tentative decision regarding publication should be made at 
the earliest possible point, such as at a conference on the 
case either before it is assigned or at the time of assign-
ment. 23 An early decision maximizes the time saved by the 
judge, but the decision must be only tentative so that 
publication would not be precluded were the opinion writing 
process to demonstrate that publication would be prudent. 24 
Third, an opinion should be published only if a majority of 
the judges participating in the decision agrees that the 
opinion meets the publication standards set forth in the 
rules.25 Further, a concurring opinion should be published 
only if it accompanies a published majority opinion.26 In 
contrast, a dissenting opinion should be published only if the 
dissenter or dissenters find that it meets the standards for 
publication on its own merits, regardless of the status of the 
majority opinion.27 When an entire opinion does not warrant 
publication, the court should publish those portions of it that 
do meet the standards. 28 
The report proposes that an opinion be published if it does 
any one of the following: (1) "lays down a new rule oflaw, or 
alters or modifies an existing rule";29 (2) "involves a legal 
issue of continuing public interest," as opposed .to "general 
public interest ... of a fleeting nature";30 (3) "criticizes exist-
ing law," especially when it calls for change by a higher court 
or the legislature;31 or (4) resolves a conflict of authority and 
"rationaliz[es] apparent divergencies in the way an existing 
rule has been applied."32 
The report further recommends that unpublished opinions 
not be cited as precedent by a court or in material presented 
to a court.33 Allowing the citation of unpublished opinions 
would give lawyers or others having special knowledge of 
those opinions an unfair advantage to use or withhold that 
23. Id. at 11. 
24. Id. at 12. 
25. Id. at 10. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 10-11. 
28. Id. at 13-14. 
29. Id. at 15. The Advisory Council specifically rejected using the term "case of 
first impression" because that term was too narrow. Id. 
30. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 17. 
33. Id. at 18. 
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knowledge.34 It also would thwart the intended goal of judi-
cial economy because citation would require the bar and 
bench to examine unpublished opinions.35 Allowing citation 
by litigants also would encourage judges to craft their un-
published opinions more carefully, thus increasing the time 
judges spend preparing them.36 
C. Responses to the Advisory Council's Report 
Every federal court of appeals37 and a majority of state 
appellate courts38 responded to the Advisory Council report 
by adopting rules that restrict publication and citation of 
unpublished opinions. Although the rules differ in procedure 
and degree of specificity, they typically have several common 
characteristics that follow the report's recommendations. 
First, most of the adopted rules provide that a majority of the 
deciding panel make a tentative publication decision as early 
in the decision making process as possible. Second, in 
general, if there is a dissenting opinion, both it and the 
majority opinion are published. Third, most rules outline 
34. Id. at 19. 
35. See id. 
36. Id. 
37. For a detailed analysis and comparison of the federal circuit plans, see 
DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS 
OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 8-9 (1985). For a summary of the 
basic characteristics of these plans, see infra text accompanying note 39. The plans 
vary with regard to the availability of unpublished opinions and whether they can 
be cited. Id. 
38. See Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publication 
Practices, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991) (surveying state plans). At least 35 states 
have a rule or statute governing the publication of opinions. See id. at 22-49. Most 
of them include or are accompanied by a no-citation corollary. See id. 
Ohio has a limited publication rule which differs from every other state. Under 
it, an opinion of an Ohio court of appeals is published only if so designated by the 
majority of the panel hearing the case and by the Ohio Supreme Court's reporter of 
decisions. Id. at 41. The Ohio Supreme Court reporter, "not a judge[,] but a bur-
eaucrat," can veto the panel's decision to publish. William M. Richman & William L. 
Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 
OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 327 (1985) (characterizing the rule as "bizarre"). Only a very 
small percentage of opinions by the courts of appeals in Ohio are published. See id. 
at 316 & n.24, 326. Unpublished opinions, however, may be cited. See id. at 333. As 
a result, a legal publisher does publish the "unpublished" opinions. Id. at 332-33. 
This whole system has been severely criticized, but with no effect. See, e.g., id. at 
326, 327, 329. 
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specific criteria on which judges should rely in making the 
publication decision: principally whether the opinion makes 
new law, criticizes existing law, or involves a matter of great 
public interest. Finally, most rules forbid citation to un-
published opinions except for the limited purposes of es:-
tablishing resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.39 
39. For discussion and evaluation of the different plans adopted by individual 
states and circuits, see generally the literature cited infra Part III and the follow-
ing: Harry L. Anstead, Selective Publication: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 189 (1982) (comparing the selective publication practice of the federal courts 
and several states to Florida's use of the "per curiam, affirmed" decision and urging 
adoption of a scheme mixing elements of the two practices); Keith H. Beyler, 
Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1989) 
(evaluating and explaining differences in several state court plans); Leah F. Chanin, 
A Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate 
Courts, 67 LAW LIBR. J. 362 (1974) (summarizing the response of state appellate 
courts and federal circuit courts of appeal to the push for nonpublication); James N. 
Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. 
J. 1224 (1975) (evaluating the undesirable side effects of limited publication and 
citation under the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's Rule 21 
and recommending improvements); David M. Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall 
Not Be Cited as Authority": The Emerging Contours of Texas Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 90(i), 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 115 (1992) (examining the scope of Texas state 
courts' Rule 90, specifically the provision prohibiting citation of unpublished 
opinions as authority); Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common 
in the Law: A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of 
Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155 
(1992) (analyzing current restrictions on publication in Kansas state and federal 
courts, and recommending a change that would allow citation of unpublished 
decisions); Peter J. Honigsberg & James A. Dikel, Unfairness in Access to and 
Citation of Unpublished Federal Court Decisions, 18 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 277 
(1988) (summarizing the history of and arguments supporting and opposing limited 
publication and citation in the federal courts, discussing discrepancies in access to 
unpublished opinions, and concluding that all decisions should be published, 
whether designated by the court as precedential or nonprecedential); Taylor Mattis, 
Precedential Value of Decisions of the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico, 
22 N.M. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the court structure and the workings of 
stare decisis within New Mexico's courts of appeal); Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on 
Judging: The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1385, 1392-94 (1990) (providing an overview of the limited publication system 
and concluding that the argument that judicial accountability is lessened through 
nonpublication is "overstated"); Jenny Mockenhaupt, Assessing the Nonpublication 
Practice of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 787 (1993) 
(analyzing limited publication and citation in Minnesota and proposing a stricter 
rule against the citation of unpublished opinions); John E. Mueller, Unpublished 
Opinion Study, ST. CT. J., Summer 1977, at 23 (summarizing a report explaining 
and evaluating nonpublication in California's Courts of Appeal); David W. 
Neubauer, Published Opinions Versus Summary Affirmations: Criminal Appeals in 
Louisiana, 10 JUST. SYS. J. 173 (1985) (reporting which of the various types of 
Louisiana criminal appeals are most and least likely to be decided by a written 
opinion); David Newbern & Douglas L. Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disap-
pearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REV. 37 (1978) (reporting the results of a survey of 
lawyers participating in Arkansas cases not designated for publication about their 
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general views on non-publication and the advisibility of not publishing opinions in 
attorneys' specific cases, and suggesting that courts find a different response to 
their problems than the negative mechanism of limited publication and citation); 
Hon. Philip Nichols, Jr., Selectiue Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. 
U. L. REv. 909 (1986) (defending the Federal Circuit's plan of limited publication 
and prohibition against citing unpublished opinions); Max N. Osborn, Publication of 
Opinions by the Texas Board of Appeals, 47 TEX. B.J. 655 (1984) (reporting a 
statistical analysis of the effect of Texas Supreme Court's Rule 452 on the publica-
tion of opinions by the state's courts of appeal); George C. ·Pratt, Summary Orders 
in the Second Circuit Under Rule 0.23, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 479 (1985) (critiquing the 
use of Second Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 0.23, which allows unpublished and 
uncitable summary orders, and outlining arguments for and against continued 
application of the rule); Edwin R. Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 KY. L.J. 
145 (1984-85) (arguing that Kentucky should do away with its current rule 
prohibiting the citation of unpublished courts of appeal decisions); Lauren K Robel, 
The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Gouernment 
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) 
(analyzing the advantages that particular classes of litigants secure through courts' 
usage of limited publication-citation rules); Robert A. Seligson & John S. Warnlof, 
The Use of Unreported· Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37 (1972) (discussing 
the limitations on publication imposed by California Rule of Court 976 and advocat-
ing limited use of Rule 976 decisions); Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: 
The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405 
(1994) (arguing from the perspective of a federal appellate judge in favor cif restric-
tions on publication and citation imposed by federal courts of appeal); Philip Shuch-
man & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges 
Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980) (explaining the 
limitS on publication mandated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' Rule 21 and 
concluding that under the rule, judges did select unimportant appeals for non publica-
tion); Milton J. Silverman, The Unwritten Law: The Unpublished Opinion in Califor-
nia, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 33 (1976) (opposing the limits on publication and citation imposed 
in California Rules of Court 976 and 977); George R. Smith, The Selectiue Publication 
of Opinions: One Court's Experience, 32 ARK. L. REV. 26 (1978) (evaluating favorably 
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 21, which limits the publication of opinions and the 
citation of unpublished opinions); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules uersus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 
(1990) (explaining the rationales behind limited publication and citation rules and 
noting that most empirical studies of the courts of appeals limit their scope to 
published opinions and ignore the importance of unpublished decisions); Herbert L. 
Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A. J. 1245 (1978) (criticizing the 
arguments supporting limits on publication and citation and concluding that it is 
impossible to deny precedential value to the decision of a higher court); David L. 
Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 581 
(1978) (criticizing Wisconsin Rule of Appellate Practice 809.23, which governs publica-
tion and citation in Wisconsin); Wisconsin State Bar Comm'n on Admin. of Justice 
and the Judiciary, Final Report on Unpublished Opinions, 57 WIS. B. BULL., Aug. 
1984, at 40 [hereinafter ·Wisconsin Bar Report) (recommending continued use of 
Wisconsin's limited publication and citation rules); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake 
in the Path of the Law: The Seuenth Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 309 (1977) (rejecting the underlying assumptions of limited publication plans 
and arguing against the suppression of unpublished opinions as mandated by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' Rule 35); Robert H. Plaskov, Note, Written Opinions 
in the Modern Legal System: Publish and Perish, 41 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1977) (evalua-
ting New York's experiments with its system of publication). 
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II. THE PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS AND A CRITIQUE OF EACH 
Just as there are features common to most restrictions on 
publication and citation, a consensus exists on the criticisms 
of them. Set out below are the five principal criticisms, each 
followed by a critique. 
A. Judicial Accountability 
1. The Criticism-First and foremost, critics argue that 
restrictions on publication and citation deal a crushing blow 
to judicial accountability and thus foster judicial irrespon-
sibility. Courts, critics maintain, are more apt to issue ar-
bitrary rulings "if their past [decisions] cannot be cited to 
them to guide and restrict their future action."4° Courts can 
use unpublished opinions to address "troublesome cases 
presenting issues the court does not wish to address in 
public" or to decide a case contrary to existing precedent 
without also changing the path and direction of the current 
law.41 One commentator links limited publication and citation 
rules with the success of tyranny.42 Tyranny flourishes when 
the law is unwritten, because then the law is known to few 
and is unreviewable by the masses.43 Written law, on the 
other hand, allows for a check of the government and gives 
the citizens a method to review the government's application 
of the law.44 For these reasons, this commentator argues that 
publication of opinions, not a limited publication system, 
better maintains an ordered system of civil liberties.45 
40. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 809. 
41. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 573, 581 (1981). 
42. Silverman, supra note 39, at 33. 
43. Id. at 33-34. 
44. See id. at 34 ("[W]ritten law created the potential for self correction."). 
According to Silverman, "the justification for non-publication must be measured 
against the compelling relationship which written law has to the preservation of 
essential freedoms." Id. Measured in this light, Silverman concludes that the non-
publication arguments must fail. Id. at 40. 
45. See id. 
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2. The Critique-Are the critics correct in arguing that an 
appellate court is more likely to be irresponsible by ignoring 
binding precedent, hiding controversial rulings, or acting ar-
bitrarily because some of its opinions are not published and 
cannot be cited to it? Theoretically these practices may be 
achievable, but practically, several reasons make this asser-
tion untenable. First is the desire of almost every judge to do 
the right thing.46 Second are the constraints imposed upon the 
appellate court by the appellate process itself. In most in-
stances, an appellate decision is a collegial one reached by 
three judges, at least two of whom must agree on the result. If 
one disagrees and writes a dissenting opinion, then both the 
majority and dissenting opinions qualify for publication under 
most adopted rules.47 In addition, other members of the same 
court usually keep abreast of the decisions of panels on which 
they do not sit, so one panel is unlikely to do something ir-
responsible without other members of the court knowing about 
it. Further, the decision ordinarily is subject to additional 
review, either by the entire court through an en bane 
procedure, or by a higher court, or both. One of the most effec-
tive ways for a litigant to obtain further review is to show that 
the present decision is inconsistent with prior decisions. This 
can be done best if the appellate court provides a written 
statement of reasons48 supporting its decision, and thus a 
statement should be prepared in every case. The present 
system, under which many cases are decided by order without 
a written statement of reasons,49 has a much greater potential 
for judicial irresponsibility. 
46. Perhaps the best expression of the judge's desire to do the right thing came 
from Judge Albert Tate, Jr. He commented that judges are motivated by three prin-
cipal drives. "First and foremost, ... is [the) motivat[ion] to achieve the humanly 
fair or socially useful result, subject to the limitations of judicial review and the 
demands of consistency with legal doctrine .... " Hon. Albert Tate, Jr., Federal Ap-
pellate Advocacy in the 1980's, 5 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 63, 65 (1981). Second is the 
"concernO that the opinion is technically sound and fairly applies relevant ... 
authority." Id. Third is the concern about how the rationale of the opinion will be 
applied in the future. Id. 
47. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
48. The designation "statement of reasons" is used to indicate that a court need 
not file a formal opinion in every case, but need only give a written rationale of its 
decision. Whether the statement of reasons should be a formal opinion and be 
published is a separate issue. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
49. From June 30, 1992 to June 30, 1993, of the 25,567 decisions on the merits 
filed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 3301 were by order without a reasoned explana-
tion. Gwendolyn Coleman, Technical Information Specialist, Statistics Division, 
Analysis and Reports Branch, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Nov. 30, 1993) 
(unpublished data, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
An additional 60 opinions were delivered orally, of which 55 were issued by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. 
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Also supporting the proposition that restrictions on publica-
tion do not result in increased judicial irresponsibility are 
empirical studies which examine the operation of the restric-
tions in appellate courts and the experience with trial courts. 
Only two in-depth studies, one in California50 and the other in 
Wisconsin, 51 have attempted to determine empirically whether 
appellate courts actually make controversial or potentially 
unpopular decisions and then hide them by either not writing 
an opinion or by writing an opinion but designating it as not 
for publication, hiding behind limited publication and citation 
rules.52 Both studies came to the same conclusion: the courts 
used the rules in good faith and seldom used them to render 
improper decisions. 53 
Even more significantly, the federal and state trial court 
systems both operate without a mandatory opinion writing 
and publication requirement. Judges rarely write opinions in 
cases disposed of at trial, and only a small fraction of those 
opinions are published, and then only at the initiative of the 
trial judge.54 Nobody has suggested, however, that the lack of 
published trial court opinions encourages irresponsible be-
havior by trial judges. 
Not quite as relevant, but nonetheless significant, is the 
English experience. While only a very small percentage of the 
opinions of the English Court of Appeal-England's inter-
mediate appellate court-are published because most are 
delivered orally from the bench, and only published opinions 
50. Mueller, supra note 39. 
51. Wisconsin Bar Report, supra note 39. 
52. The other studies cited in supra note 39 almost always focus on a particular 
area of substantive law and attempt to show inconsistency between some published 
and unpublished opinions. Cf, e.g., Robel, supra note 39 (examining a survey of 
government lawyers). These studies, however, prove only that in the eyes of some 
scholars the decisions ofa court are not perfectly consistent. Law reviews, for example, 
consist almost entirely of articles routinely drawing the same type of conclusion from 
an analysis of only published opinions. Thus, there is no basis for suggesting that 
limited publication and citation rules are the cause of the supposed inconsistency. 
53. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 ("There was no basis to conclude that large 
numbers of significant decisions are being 'buried' in unpublished opinions."); Wiscon-
sin Bar Report, supra note 39, at 41 (finding that "the Court of Appeals Publication 
Committee has been faithful to the non-publication guidelines" and that "the criteria 
applied by the Court of Appeals was effective in keeping out cases which shouldn't 
be published"). 
54. J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH 22, 45 (5th ed. 1990). 
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can be cited,55 it has never been argued that their limited 
publication rule has resulted in judicial irresponsibility.56 
If an appellate court writes a statement of reasons which 
goes unpublished, the decision is not necessarily secret and 
hidden from public attention. The losing party still may use 
the written statement of reasons to appeal to a higher court 
or to complain to the legislature, the news media, or interest 
groups; the party; or more likely its attorney, even may write 
· a law review article about it. If the case is of public interest, 
the news media will publicize the decision. A case involving a 
controversial crime or issue such as obscenity, abortion 
rights, gay rights, sex or race discrimination, or an election 
dispute will receive attention regardless of whether the 
opinion is published. In any event, the limited publication 
rules usually do call for the publication of an opinion in these 
types of cases.57 
For those who wish to study a court's decisions in a par-
ticular area, whether concerning the substantive law, 
procedure, the parties involved, or on any other basis, the 
researcher may review and critique the court's own records, 
the briefs submitted, the trial court record, and the court's 
statement of reasons. Researchers regularly do this with the 
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari petitions, 
which rarely are accompanied by opinions except in dissent, 
as well as with appellate court actions on which no opinion is 
written, such as disposition of interlocutory appeals.58 
Neither the California nor the Wisconsin study suggested 
that the lack of published opinions supporting these decisions 
has led to judicial irresponsibility. 
55. RoBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 104-07, 150 (1990) (describing the English re-
porting system and giving statistics on the percentages of opinions reported and un-
reported, and the number of appeals terminated on the merits). In 1986, only 39% 
of the 884 opinions of the English Court of Appeal were reported. Id. at 107, 150. 
56. But cf Burton M. Atkins, Selection, Reporting and the Communication of 
Legal Rights in England, 76 JUDICATURE 58, 67 (1992) (noting·that "outcomes of 
published and unpublished decisions [in England] differ substantially" and offering 
sociological and statistical explanations for this finding, but falling short of criticiz-
ing the courts). 
57. E.g., COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, supra note 5, at 16 
(recommending publication of cases "involv[ing] a legal issue of continuing public 
interest"); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
58. E.g., Michael Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal 
Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1199-1200 (1990) (studying the denial of inter-
locutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). 
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Perhaps the weakest part of the judicial accountability 
criticism is that it demonstrates a lack of understanding 
about the relationship between the real reasons for a judicial 
decision and the reasons given in the opinion supporting that 
decision. As I have explained in a recent article,59 there is no 
necessary relationship between the two. The written state-
ment of reasons merely seeks to legitimize the court's 
decision by making it appear consistent with prior opinions 
and the facts as shown by the record.60 If a court is intent 
upon acting irresponsibly, it can do so with a published opin-
ion just as well as without one. The leeways of precedent and 
the fuzziness of the record almost always enable a court to 
make any decision appear reasonable.61 Consequently, the 
protection against irresponsibility comes not from the pub-
lished opinion, but from the other constraints upon the ap-
pellate process, particularly the parties' ability to examine 
and dispute the required written statement of reasons. 
Fear of judicial irresponsibility is a legitimate concern. 
American appellate systems, however, have many built-in 
protections to prevent against this irresponsibility without 
mandatory publication of opinions. Accordi~gly, this fear of 
irresponsibility does not justify mandatory publication. 
B. Review by a Higher Court 
1. The Criticism-Critics contend that review by a higher 
level is hampered by limited access to all opinions.62 They 
argue that the law announced in published cases and the 
results reached in unpublished decisions may differ.63 The 
potential for perceptions of judicial impropriety also in-
creases, because litigants may conclude that the opinion was 
not published because the court lacked sufficient reasons to 
support a coherent rationale.64 Further, judges can use 
59. Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: 
A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
60. Id. at 27. 
61. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
62-91 (1960) for an explanation of how precedent can be avoided. 
62. E.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 40, at 809. 
63. See, e.g., Render, supra note 39, at 158-60. 
64. Id. at 158. 
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unpublished opinions to hide embarrassing information about 
litigants, to send messages to government agencies on how 
the agencies should act in the future without disapproving of 
past actions, or to save lawyers from embarrassment by not 
revealing that an attorney's improper or negligent conduct 
was the basis for the decision-none of which furthers a 
responsible judiciary.65 Judges even can use unpublished 
opinions to rely on the rationale of a past unpublished 
opinion, without disclosing the source of its reasoning.66 "If 
'[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,' then limited 
publication may permit sores to fester."67 
2. The Critique-The criticism that restrictions on 
publication and citation interfere with review by a higher 
court, like the criticism that they encourage judicial irrespon-
sibility,68 ignores the constraints upon judges inherent in the 
appellate process and misunderstands the appellate process 
itself. If an intermediate appellate court does in fact decide a 
case with an unpublished statement of reasohs contrary to 
the published case law, the losing party is in a perfect posi-
tion to seek review in a higher court by pointing out the 
discrepancy. Even if the losing party cannot cite unpublished 
decisions of cases not following the published case law, that 
party's appeal is not weakened. It is the inconsistency of the 
lower court's unpublished opinion with prior published 
opinions that is important. As long as the litigant can cite 
published cases that contradict the lower court's decision in 
his case, the fact that there are also other cases in which the 
court did not follow binding precedent is irrelevant to the 
party's chances for obtaining appellate review. 
In any event, the statements of reasons in those un-
published, inconsistent cases are unlikely to be of much help 
because they will seldom, if ever, show a conscious disregard 
of the published case law. At most, unpublished opinions will 
show lack of awareness of the accepted published law, but 
that unawareness is best attributed not to the deciding 
courts' schemes but to the failure of counsel to bring it to the 
courts' attention. If appellate judges really are intent upon 
65. See Paul Marcotte, Unpublished But Influential: With Technology, Opinions 
Not in the Law Books Can Be Misused, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 26. 
66. Id. 
67. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 581 (quoting LOUIS BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
68. See supra Part II.A. 
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deciding a case contrary to binding precedent, they are more 
likely to do so by reading the precedent so narrowly or con-
struing the facts in such a way as to make the precedent 
inapplicable to the present case. If the assumption is that 
judges are dishonest, it does not follow that they are foolish 
enough not to cover their tracks. 
C. Predicting Precedential Value 
1. The Criticism-The third common criticism of re-
stricted publication and citation rules attacks the very foun-
dation on which the restrictions are based. Though standards 
have been adopted to aid judges in determining whether to 
publish, critics often question the ability of judges to decide 
conclusively what is or is not of precedential value. In the 
first place, the rules' attempt to limit the scope of the term 
"precedent" at all is a doubtful endeavor. In the common law 
system, all decisions are precedent, regardless ·of whether 
they are published.69 To deny that they are precedent is to 
deny that they exist, an impossibility.70 An unpublished, un-
citable decision cannot fit with the definition of stare decisis 
and the purpose of the common law, regardless of its com-
pliance with a set of standardized guidelines to determine its 
precedential value.71 This is because "all decisions make law, 
or at least contribute to the process, for each shows [prospec-
tive litigants] how courts actually resolve disputes. "72 
Additionally, it is debatable whether judges actually can 
predict precedential value, especially when that prediction is 
made early in the decision making process. "An early decision 
not to publish entails significant costs, ... for value inheres 
in the actual writing of the opinion."73 An early decision not 
to publish may affect not only the form in which the final 
decision is rendered, but also the actual reasoning or result.74 
69. See Foa, supra note 39, at 310-13. 
70. See id. at 310 ("Laws which cannot function as reasons for actions ... are 
not really laws at all, for they cannot affect the future decision-making of the 
citizenry."). 
71. Id. at 310-13. 
72. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 579. 
73. Id. at 581. 
74. Id. 
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If that occurs, the judicial process may suffer. 75 Furthermore, 
what is determined to be nonprecedential now may be of 
value to future litigants. Limited publication and citation 
rules require judges to determine in advance the rule of law 
that will emerge from a case, and then to determine the 
effect of their decisions on the development of the law.76 
Because our common law system emphasizes the importance 
of facts in each case, judges hardly can hope to predict the 
facts of future disputes. They cannot know today what will be 
crucial to litigants of tomorrow, even when they follow the 
standards designed to aid them in this determination. There 
is no such thing as the "mere application of a rule, for every 
case constitutes a needed reaffirmation and/or extension, at 
least temporarily, of the rule."77 
Some commentators even have argued that the rules' 
precedential criteria are flawed. Numerous studies have dem-
onstrated that opinions that were precedential have not been 
published. 78 
Moreover, the fact that ail opinion raises no new issue of 
law does not necessarily diminish the decision's importance. 
Rather, "the frequency with which issues arise is some 
measure of their importance."79 It is not always the new 
question that requires attention, but sometimes the old one. 80 
Change results in our system of law not only because a "new" 
issue of law arises, but also because an old issue recurs re-
peatedly. A well established rule might need to be changed.81 
Limiting the precedent available in a certain area hurts those 
litigants who wish to use that precedent to establish change. 
The accumulation of decisions in an area allows litigants to 
75. Id. 
76. Foa, supra note 39, at 312-13. 
77. Id. at 312. 
78. E.g., Foa, supra note 39 (evaluating the precedential value of opinions un-
published by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit); Render, 
supra note 39, at 155-62 (discussing unpublished but otherwise precedential 
decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals); Robel, supra note 39, at 950-52 
(analyzing a series of unpublished yet useful opinions by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning the pleading requirements for RICO viola-
tions). 
79. Silverman, supra note 39, at 34. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 34-35. Silverman cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as an 
example of a decision overruling a well-established rule. Silverman, supra note 39, 
at 35. I would also include Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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assess the stability of a doctrine with greater confidence and 
helps them "flesh out a precedent ... [to] make it more un-
derstandable."s2 "[T]he sweep of a group of cases makes it 
easier to understand the principles involved."s3 
2. The Critique-The criticism that restricted publication 
and citation rules fly in the face of stare decisis and thus are 
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the common-law 
system ignores the historical development and present opera-
tion ofthe system of reporting opinions in England, where our 
common-law system and the principles of precedent and stare 
decisis developed. The English opinion-reporting system has 
never published and does not today publish every opinion of 
English appellate courts, even though the total number of 
opinions issued each year in the English Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords is little more than 1000.s4 In fact, these 
courts always have published only a very small percentage of 
their opinions, limited to those for which a barrister prepares 
a summary of the opinion. s5 This system was a necessary 
product of the practice of English courts to render most 
opinions orally rather than in writing.86 It was not until 1951 
that transcripts of the oral opinions were produced and 
placed in England's Supreme Court library in the Royal 
Courts of Justice.s7 Today this library is the only place in 
which the actual opinions can be found, other than on com-
puter databases.ss An official transcript will not be cited in 
the courts, however, because it does not meet the two 
requisites for citation: the transcript is not a summary 
prepared by a barrister and it is not published somewhere, 
whether in a report or a newspaper.s9 There is no official 
report,90 only reports published under the auspices of a com-
mittee comprised of the bar (barristers), the Law Society 
(solicitors), and private publishers.91 Moreover, the texts of 
82. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non·Precedential Prece· 
dent-Limited Publication and No·Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (1978). 
83. Id. 
84. See MARTINEAU, supra note 55, at 150. For a further description of the 
English reporting system, see id. at 104-07. 
85. Id. at 104-07. 
86. Id. at 106-07. 
87. Id. at 105-06. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 104. 
91. Id. at 105. 
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the opinions included in the computer databases cannot be 
cited. The American rules limiting publication and citation 
are, in fact, far closer to the English system than the policies 
of unlimited publication and citation advocated by the critics 
of the American rules. 
The criticism based on the unpredictability of a case's pre-
cedential value also is misplaced, although for a different 
reason. Essentially this criticism is premised on an extreme 
version of legal realism holding that all precedent is fact 
based and that because the facts of every case are different, 
every case is a unique precedent and thus should be 
published. This argument not only overstates legal realism,92 
but if carried to its logical conclusion would destroy the un-
derlying principle of stare decisis, that similar cases should 
be decided similarly. If all cases are different because their 
facts are different, there can be no precedent. The doctrine of 
stare decisis assumes that some opinions do make law that is 
valid beyond the narrow facts of the individual case. Limited 
publication and citation rules reflect this assumption and 
seek to publish only those opinions that can fairly be said to 
make law. There is no reason why in most cases the judges 
faced with deciding a case cannot determine early whether 
their decision will make law worthy of writing an opinion. As 
to citation rules, to prove that an area of law requires 
change, litigants need not necessarily cite recent published 
opinions, but only trial and appellate court decisions which 
the proponents of change assert reflect an outmoded legal 
principle. 
D. Equality of Access 
1. The Criticism-Critics of restricted publication and 
citation also raise the issue of unfairness. They argue that 
although the citation restrictions were designed to prevent 
certain litigants from gaining an advantage over those with 
less access to unpublished opinions, that advantage still 
92. For a more complete statement of legal realism, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960). See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 for a discus-
sion of how judges can avoid precedent without having to withhold publication of an 
errant decision. 
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exists.93 The restrictions reduce, "but do not eliminate[, the] 
effective use of unpublished opinions."94 Experienced litigants 
can use "arguments, exact language, and hypotheticals" of an 
unpublished opinion without ever revealing to the bench or 
the other side the source of this material.95 If the question is 
really fairness, critics argue, the proper solution is not to 
prohibit citation, but to require litigants to acknowledge the 
source of their reasoning and conclusions so that the other 
side stands on an equal footing before the bench. 96 
2. The Critique-The supposed benefits of having access 
to unpublished opinions that may not be cited are marginal 
at best. For the benefits to be substantial, the unpublished 
arguments, language, or hypotheticals must be so appealing 
that the court will be more likely to adopt the position of the 
party advancing the borrowed argument than that of his 
opponent. There is little merit in this contention. Far more 
persuasive would be to cite the court itself as the source of 
the argument, language, or hypothetical because a court is " 
always most concerned with its own precedent. Without cita-
tion, the unpublished material has no more persuasive force 
than if its proponent were its creator. Essentially the only 
difference is between the court thinking that the court agrees 
with the party rather than the court agreeing with its own 
unattributed prior reasoning. In either event, the court will 
arrive at the same result. 
To the extent that some persons gain an advantage from 
being able to afford access to unpublished opinions while 
others cannot, unlimited citation is not the only alternative. 
Others are to publish all opinions or to prevent access to 
unpublished opinions. The former would, of course, eliminate 
all of the advantages of limited publication. The latter is 
discussed in the next section. 
E. Judicial and Litigant Economy 
1. The Criticism-Finally, advocates of unlimited publica-
tion and citation attack the concept of restricted publication 
93. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 82, at 1195. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1196. 
96. See id. at 1199. 
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and citation at its base. They question whether or not the 
restrictions actually bring about the judicial and litigant 
economy predicted by their supporters.97 Empirical assess-
ments have examined the federal circuits' caseloads, publica-
tion standards, time lapses between oral argument and 
opinion, and total productivity. Unfortunately, all of these 
have been relatively inconclusive. The critics argue that these 
data do not demonstrate conclusively that restricted publica-
tion rules increase judicial productivity.98 
Critics also contend that the reports of the staggering 
number of opinions are exaggerated. Some argue that there is 
no indication that the "present trend" of opinion proliferation 
will continue.99 Further, they argue that even if the current 
boom should continue, technologies such as microfiche, 
microfilm, computer databases, and CD-ROM storage could 
alleviate space and storage dilemmas at a reasonable cost.100 
One critic argues that with the advent of LEXIS and 
Westlaw, the justification for restricting publication loses 
strength.101 She contends that with the availability ·of the 
computer data banks, there should be no reason for limited 
publication. 102 She further predicts that the competition 
between electronic database services soon will lead to on-line 
access to all opinions, resulting in a system of universal 
publication.103 
The critics also dispute the argument that nonpublication 
saves time. Were cases published more frequently, judges 
would have more available precedent to work with, and the 
work required to decide cases would in fact decrease. "[M]erely 
97. See supra Part I. 
98. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 593-626; see also supra 
note 39 (listing articles assessing the effect of limited publication and citation rules 
in different jurisdictions). 
99. E.g., Silverman, supra note 39, at 38. But see supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text for the contention that observers have lamented the proliferation of 
opinions for the last 60 years. 
100. Silverman, supra note 39, at 38. 
101. SUSAN w. BRENNER, PRECEDENT INFLATION 267-69 (1992). In a different 
piece, Brenner notes that the availability of cases on-line weakens the arguments 
based on limited space availability and the cost of maintaining libraries. Susan W. 
Brenner, Of Publication and Precedent: An Inquiry Into the Ethnomethodology of 
Case Reporting in the American Legal System, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 461, 534-40 
(1990). In addition, she argues that the searching and finding techniques available 
in computer-aided research weaken the argument that finding the relevant cases 
available in the mass of precedent will be next to impossible. Id. 
102. BRENNER, supra note 101, at 264. 
103. Id. 
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cumulative opinions [should not] threaten the cohesiveness of 
the common law."104 Instead, "they should, if anything, make 
research and discernment of principle easier, since there will 
be more cases elaborating a principle, and some of those 
cases will be more recent as well."105 
Proposals for change have not been lacking either in 
number or in variety. Some commentators have argued for a 
complete repeal of publication and citation restrictions. 106 
Others have proposed compromise along a middle ground. 
One proposal is to permit citation of unpublished opinions as 
persuasive but not binding authority. 107 This would put un-
published opinions on at least an equal footing with other 
nonprecedential matters currently citable to the court such as 
sociological data, treatises, and law review articles. 108 A court 
then could follow the unpublished opinion if the court found 
the reasoning persuasive enough when applied to the facts of 
the case at hand. 109 Under this scheme, the proper use of 
unpublished opinions is not set out by a bright line rule, but 
"depends on the wisdom and integrity of judges. "110 Other 
commentators believe that a solution exists in partial 
publication, which permits the publication and citation of a 
portion of an opinion, leaving unpublished the portions that 
do not satisfy the criteria for publication.111 Partial publica-
tion would reduce the length of published opinions, yet 
permit the publication of portions of more opinions, thus 
increasing access and judicial accountability. 112 "A partial 
publication rule would result in fewer published pages with 
104. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 82, at 1191. 
105. Id. 
106. E.g., Richard L. Neumeier, Unpublished Opinions: Their Threat to the Ap-
pellate System, BRIEF, Spring 1988, at 22, 40 (arguing that cases or statutes that 
prohibit the citation of unpublished cases are "unwise [and) probably unconstitu-
tional"); see also Hinderks & Leben, supra note 39, at 219 (urging the adoption of 
rules that permit citation of unpublished opinions if the citing litigant provides 
copies of the decision to the court and opposing parties); Honigsberg & Dike!, supra 
note 39, at 299 (concluding that a litigant should have the opportunity to convince 
the court of the importance of a non-precedential decision to her case). 
107. George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 39 
MERCER L. REV. 477, 492 (1988). 
108. See id. at 490-91. 
109. See id. at 491. 
110. Id. at 493. 
111. E.g., Eva S. Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Proposal For Change in the 
"Packaging" of California Court of Appeal Opinions To Provide More Useful Infor-
mation to the Consumer, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 53, 66-74 (1979). 
112. Id. at 67. 
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more precedentially useful 'meat' on each page than the 
present 'all or nothing' rule."113 Most advocates of restricted 
publication and citation, meanwhile, have stood firm or 
proposed slight changes that they believe would make the 
rules work more effectively.114 
2. The Critique-Those who argue that writing a short 
memorandum for use solely by the parties involves just as 
much time as writing a full opinion for publication simply do 
not understand the appellate opinion writing process. The 
only empirical study of how appellate judges spend their time 
shows that they devote approximately one half of their time 
to writing opinions, more than they spend on any other 
duties. 115 Clearly, the ability of a court to cope with its 
113. Id. at 72. 
114. Most commentators advocating this position admit some adjustments may 
be needed and propose small changes in the operation of existing plans. These 
changes are minor, involving such features as: (1) whether the decision to publish 
should be made by a panel, the writing judge, an independent committee, or the 
entire bar within a jurisdiction, e.g., Robert P. Andreani, Independent Panels to 
Choose Publishable Opinions: A Solution to the Problems of California's Selective 
Publication System, 12 PAC. L.J. 727, 741-43 (1981) (suggesting that the publication 
decision be made by an independent panel composed of both legal scholars and 
practicing attorneys selected pursuant to standards set by the California Supreme 
Court and subject to review by that court); Gardner, supra note 39, at 1227 (advoca-
ting that the decision to publish should be in the hands of any federal judge within 
the circuit, or ideally, by any member of the bar); Joyce J. George, Query: Is There a 
More Systematic Way to Manage Publication of Opinions, 71 JUDICATURE 305, 359 
(1988) (suggesting that the publication decision remain the responsibility of the 
writing judge); Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 (concluding that the number of 
opinions that should be published but are not would be reduced if judges would 
"actively participate in reaching a collegial decision respecting publication in every 
appeal"); (2) whether attorneys citing unpublished opinions in jurisdictions where 
citation is limited or prohibited should be sanctioned or be cited for ethics viola-
tions, see Gunn, supra note 39, at 141 (suggesting that both are feasible options to 
enforce the "shall not be cited as authority" language of Texas's limited publication 
plan); (3) whether the plan should include an option by which attorneys may 
request that a previously unpublished opinion be published, see Pratt, supra note 
39, at 498 (noting a proposal in which a committee of the bar would recommend 
which summary orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
should be published as per curiam opinions); and (4) whether the jurisdiction should 
make an express statement as to whether it favors or disfavors limited publication, 
rather than leaving the message implicit in the adopted plan. See Mockenhaupt, 
supra note 39, at 807 (proposing that Minnesota eliminate its current rule, which 
allows citation to unpublished cases pending notice to opposing counsel 48 hours in 
advance, and instead add to its limited publication rule a presumption in favor of 
publication); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 626-30 (proposing a model rule 
that includes a presumption in favor of publication and indicating that empirical 
data shows that such a presumption does in fact raise publication rates). But see 
Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 (rejecting a presumption for or against publication). 
115. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, 
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caseload is determined in large part by how much time a 
judge must devote to a particular opinion. If that opinion is 
intended solely for the parties to the appeal and their at-
torneys, the judge can write in an almost shorthand fashion, 
with little space or time devoted to a recital of the procedural 
history or the facts. The statement of reasons can and should 
be limited to addressing the one or two main issues raised by 
the appellant and .why, with a citation to only one or two 
cases, the appellant's argument is rejected. Only when the 
trial judge ignored obvious controlling authority should a 
reversal be by unpublished opinion. The judge need devote 
little time writing the unpublished statement of reasons, 
because they often can be written by a. law clerk or staff 
attorney. 
In contrast is the time and care that goes into a published 
opinion that makes new law, criticizes or rejects existing law, 
explains the court's decision in a highly controversial case, or 
applies existing law to facts substantially different from prior 
cases. us This opinion becomes the object of study by the bar, 
judges, and scholars, who will dissect, analyze, and apply or 
distinguish the language of an opinion with the care given to 
few written works apart from the Bible and the works of 
Shakespeare. Judicial opinions, like the Bible, become the 
bases on which people arrange their lives and conduct their 
affairs. AB time permits, these opinions should be written 
with the greatest of care and precision in language. There-
fore, a brief statement of reasons by the court is appropriate 
only when the court is performing its limited "review-for-
correctness function. "117 The statement of reasons should 
inform the parties that their contentions have been con-
sidered, and provide a rational basis for the court's con-
clusion. A full opinion, on the other hand, is appropriate 
when the court performs its law development function. An 
opinion developing law demands far greater care and time 
than the review-for-correctness statement of reasons. us 
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 49-50 
(1975) (summarizing a study conducted in 1971-1972 showing that Third Circuit 
judges devoted 48.2% of their time "to the writing and clearing of opinions"). 
116. For a description of one judge's approach to writing a full opinion, see 
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL AP-
PELLATE BENCH 155-70 (1980). See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION 
WRITING (1990) (presenting theory and practice of writing opinions). 
117. ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 20-22. 
118. Id. 
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Because review-for-correctness statements of reasons gen-
erally go unpublished, since judges rarely find error, the 
judges and their staffs can and do devote much less time to 
them. The savings in judicial time are, consequently, real and 
substantial. Were they not, appellate courts could not have 
had the dramatic increases in cases disposed of on the merits 
per judge that have occurred in the past thirty years. 
The argument that the number of opinions is not increas-
ing and that legal research would not be more difficult if all 
opinions were published also has little validity. The number 
of appeals decided on the merits by the federal courts of 
appeal rose from 3552 in 1964,119 when the U.S. Judicial Con-
ference first called for limited publication, to 23,597 in 
1992, 120 almost a sixfold increase. Just between 1985 and 
1992, the number of appeals terminated on the merits by 
these courts increased from 16,369 to 23,597, an increase of 
over fifty percent in just seven years. 121 The number in-
creases each year, with no end in sight. In 1964, virtually all 
opinions were published because there were no limited 
publication rules. 122 In 1992, only 29.7% of the opinions were 
published, but the total published was 6980, 123 still over twice 
as many as in 1964. Notwithstanding the three-fourths 
reduction in the percentage of opinions published by the 
courts of appeals, the growth in the number of pages 
published was so great that in October 1993, West Publishing 
Company (West) issued the first volume of the Federal 
Reporter, Third Series (F.3d) after completing 999 volumes of 
the Federal Reporter, Second Series (F.2d). Each of the more 
recent volumes of F.2d contains approximately 1500 pages, 
compared to 1000 when F.2d was first published in 1925. It 
took fifty years to issue the first 500 volumes of F.2d, but 
only eighteen years, 1975 to 1993, for the last 499. The 
number of opinions sent to West for publication each year by 
both state and federal courts increased from 27 ,336 in 1964 
119. 1964 REPORT, supra note 4, at 204 tbl. Bl. 
120. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DmECTOR 110 tbl. 83 [hereinafter 
1992 ANNUAL REPORT). 
· 121. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1985 
ANNUAL REPORT 261-65 tbl. B5; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at tbl. 83. 
122. Cf text accompanying supra note 5. 
123. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at tbl. 83. 
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to 66,500 in 1992, 124 even with the large number of un-
published opinions and dispositions issued without opinion. 
Significantly, the 1964 total of 27,336 opinions was ap-
proximately 200 less than in 1929, and only about 8000 more 
than in 1895.125 
The effect of limited publication rules can be seen by com-
paring the number of opinions published by West in its 
various reporters and the number included in its computer-
based Westlaw system. In addition to the 66,500 opinions 
received for publication, approximately 33,500 additional 
opinions are included in Westlaw.126 Essentially, 100,000 
opinions are being added to the database each year. And 
these do not include all of the opinions being written, because 
some courts, including several federal courts of appeals, do 
not send their opinions to Westlaw or LEXIS. 127 If every 
opinion of every court were included, the total would probab-
ly exceed 150,000 per year. Those who argue that opinion 
proliferation is not a problem are ignoring or are unaware of 
the facts. 
Another argument is that the inclusion of both published 
and unpublished opinions in the commercial computer based 
systems of LEXIS and Westlaw eliminates the rationale 
behind the limited publication and citation rules. This argu-
ment identifies the right culprit, but the wrong problem and 
the wrong solution. There is no doubt that computer based 
124. Telephone Interview with Donna M. Bergsgaard, Manager, Reporter-Digest 
Department, West Publishing Company (Nov. 24 & 30, 1993) (unpublished data, on 
file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). _Data on years prior to 
1989 can be found in ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 1-2. 
125. See ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 1-2 (calculations computed by the author). 
126. Bergsgaard Interview, supra note 124. 
127. West Publishing Company, for example, receives unpublished opinions for 
inclusion in Westlaw from eight United States courts of appeal (excluding the 
Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits) and only nine states. Id. The refusal of 
the Fifth Circuit to send unpublished opinions to Westlaw and LEXIS was con-
firmed by an official of the Fifth Circuit. Telephone Interview with Dawn Eiserloh, 
Opinion Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Nov. 24, 1993). 
The refusal results from the Fifth Circuit's opinion distribution plan, which 
provides that unpublished opinions are to be placed in the court's library and sent 
only to the parties and to the court's printer, the latter only for inclusion in the 
table of unpublished opinions printed periodically in the Federal Reporter. 
Telephone Interview with Dawn Eiserloh, Opinion Clerk, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Nov. 30, 1993). In the 1992 fiscal year, the Fifth 
Circuit filed 2094 unpublished opinions. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 
tbl. S3 (total of all Fifth Circuit opinions accompanied by reasons given by the court 
for its decision calculated by the author). 
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systems have to a large degree destroyed the effectiveness of 
rules restricting publication. Judges know their "unpub-
lished" opinions will be read by a far larger audience than 
merely the parties to the appeal. Thus, they may feel com-
pelled to write for the larger audience, thereby negating one 
of the principal benefits of unpublished opinions: reduced 
writing time.128 Even more importantly, those who engage in 
legal research-judges, attorneys, and scholars-must now 
search all opinions in the database, whether designated for 
publication or not, to ensure that they have not missed 
anything that might be useful. Research in the databases is 
not, however, free or even cheap, whether considering the 
cost of the researcher's time or the cost of access to the 
databases. 
Whether done in books or computer databases, legal 
research takes time, and time is money. The more opinions 
available to research, the more time the research takes, and 
the greater the cost. The only solution to the computer data-
base problem is not to abandon limited publication, but to 
keep out of the databases statements of reasons not desig-
nated for publication. 
III. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
As demonstrated in Part II, the problems with restricted 
publication and citation do not justify eliminating or even 
weakening the restrictions. That is not to say, however, that 
the restrictions are not without problems. These problems 
stem from three primary causes: (1) the lack of a fail-safe 
system to ensure that all precedential opinions are published; 
(2) the failure to enforce strictly the rules restricting citation; 
and (3) the inclusion in computer databases of statements of 
reasons designated "not for publication." 
As to the first, there is no question that some opinions that 
make law are still designated "not for publication." Whatever 
the reason-and there is no basis for suspecting that the 
decision is based on improper grounds-the rules should 
provide means to correct the error. One means should be 
preventive, avoiding the problem before it occurs. This can be 
128. See text accompanying supra notes 35-36 and Part 11.E. 
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done by establishing an internal review system within each 
court. An advisory publication panel of judges, staff at-
torneys, or both, would review each statement of reasons 
tentatively designated as "not for publication" to determine 
whether the statement meets any of the criteria for publica-
tion. Were the publication panel to conclude that it does, the 
authoring judge would be required to expand the statement 
to make it suitable for publication, primarily by adding facts 
sufficient to make the opinion understandable to those who 
are not parties to the appeal. 
Another means should be remedial, correcting the problem 
after it occurs. The court's rules should provide that sub-
sequent to issuance of the unpublished statement of reasons, 
any person, including the parties, who becomes aware of the 
statement, and who believes that the statement meets one of 
the criteria for publication, could petition the court or 
publication panel to order the statement published. If the 
original deciding panel or the advisory publication panel 
agreed, the statement could be published as an opinion, again 
after the addition of a statement of facts necessary to make 
the opinion understandable to outsiders. Because there is no 
fixed time in which nonpariies will discover the statement of 
reasons or determine its significance, the rules should allow 
for an unlimited time to submit a petition for publication. 
This double system of checks on the initial publication 
decision should ensure the publication of virtually all opin-
ions of precedential value. 
The second and third problems, the lack of strict enforce-
ment and the availability of unpublished opinions from com-
puter databases, are related closely and the correction of one 
should eliminate the other. The best way to make restricted 
publication and citation rules work effectively is to enforce 
strictly the rules against both attorneys and the courts, 
primarily the latter. If a court relies on an unpublished 
opinion, even once, that court not only invites, but almost 
demands, that other judges on that court, lower courts, and 
attorneys practicing in the court's jurisdiction research the 
court's unpublished as well as its published opinions.129 If 
129. Perhaps the worst of all worlds was demonstrated by the recent case of 
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993). In that case the court held that 
it was bound by a previous unpublished opinion. Id. at 355 (citing Baugh v. Trans 
World Airlines, No. 90-2074 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 1990)). The opinion expressed 
disagreement with the earlier decision, id., and called for en bane review of the 
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lightning strikes once, the prudent judge or attorney must 
assume that it can and will strike again. The inevitable 
result is that the computer based research systems will in-
clude every opinion a court issues, unpublished and pub-
lished. On the other hand, once the legal community learned 
that citing unpublished opinions to the court brings no ad-
vantage, and perhaps even brings disadvantage, the need to 
research them should cease and thus the research companies 
would lose the economic incentive to include unpublished 
opinions in their computer databases. 
Although strict adherence to the no-citation rule would be 
the principal means to eliminate the unofficial publication of 
unpublished opinions, the courts could take additional steps 
to discourage the unofficial publication of the statements of 
reasons designated as "not for publication." One simple step 
would be to refrain from sending the statements to persons 
other than parties. Although a statement of reasons placed in 
the pleading file of a case is no doubt a public document and 
subject to being copied, 130 at the very least the court could 
refuse to send copies to nonparties, including Westlaw and 
LEXIS, and insist that anyone who wants a copy come to the 
court clerk's office to copy it, the same as for any other docu-
ment on file with the court. Many courts, including four 
United States courts of appeals,131 now follow this practice, 
with the result that their unpublished opinions are not in-
cluded in the computer databases. If every court followed the 
same practice, the problem of published "unpublished" 
opinions would be eliminated. 
Another simple step, one perhaps even more useful, would 
be for the court not to place the unpublished statement of 
reasons in the case's pleading file or in its electronic 
counterpart, but to incorporate it in the letter from the clerk 
issues, id. at 356, but still adhered to the decision. Id. at 355-56. The result was 
consistent, however, with Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.3, which provides that un-
published opinions are precedent. Id. at 355. 
130. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The status of judicial 
opinions is reviewed in Francine Biscardi, The Historical Deuelopment of the Law 
Concerning Judicial Report Publication, 85 LAw LIBR. J. 531, 532-33 (1993) (sho-
wing that Wheaton created a private market for offering timely access to judicial 
rulings) and in L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
719, 813-14 (1989) (analyzing the effects of West Publishing Company's success in 
maintaining its monopoly over pinpoint cites to its National Reporter system). 
131. The circuits which do not allow their unpublished opinions to be placed on-
line are the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh. See supra note 127. 
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to the parties notifying the parties of the court's decision in 
the case. The letter would go on to state: "The Court has 
directed me to advise you that its reasons for its decision 
were .... " Because this letter would be placed in the cor-
respondence file rather than the pleading file, it would not be 
part of the formal record in the case. This letter would be 
subject to inspection by others, but would not look like an 
opinion or be easily incorporated into a computer database. 132 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate judges were the principal initiators of the restric-
tions on publication and citation of opinions, enabling them 
to dispose of more cases more quickly while reducing the time 
and expense involved in researching opinions. To a large 
degree these rules have worked well, but recently they have 
been subjected to a drumbeat of criticism133 and are seriously 
threatened by the inclusion of all unpublished opinions m 
computer databases marketed to the legal community. 134 
132. The most recent development in the field of opinion publication has been 
the effort to abandon the traditional system of citation to the printed case reporters. 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has allowed, and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has required, litigants to cite cases using a "public 
domain citation," which is limited to the case's name, case number, deciding court, 
and date. Ernest E. Svenson, Alternative Citation Styles Gain Ground, A.B.A. 
LITIG. NEWS, Aug. 1994, at 1, 6 (discussing arguments for public domain citation 
which are being considered by a number of groups across the country). This type of 
citation system is actually a non-citation system because it gives only the name and 
number of the case and not where the opinion can be found by the researcher. This 
necessarily would complicate research. The researcher first would have to find 
where the case is published or the computer database in which it is located, and 
then find or retrieve the text. A computer and a subscription to the service that 
includes the text of the court's opinions would, of course, be necessary to obtain the 
text electronically. 
For some, case name and number citation is merely an inevitable step on the 
road to the information highway, when all information and texts will be available 
only electronically, and books and libraries will go the way of stone tablets and 
manuscripts handwritten by monks. For others, the new system is a way of defeat-
ing West Publishing Company's near monopoly on the publication of judicial 
opinions. Susan Hansen, Fending Off the Future, AM. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 74. To 
the author, there is no evidence that the traditional publication citation system is 
not still cheaper, quicker, and accessible to more researchers than the electronic 
non-citation system now advocated by some. Until that evidence is conclusive, the 
traditional system should be retained. 
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra text following note 127. 
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This Article has attempted to demonstrate that most 
criticisms of the limited publication and citation rules are 
invalid. Rather, despite weaknesses in the courts' administra-
tion of the rules, the goals of the rules remain valid. Rather 
than eliminate the rules, several changes should be made in 
their administration. First, the rules should provide for an 
internal review of a decision not to publish. Second, they 
should permit anyone, party or nonparty, to petition the 
court to publish an unpublished statement of reasons. Third, 
courts should not put unpublished statements of reasons in 
the form of an opinion, but should incorporate them into a 
letter from the clerk to the parties. Fourth, and most impor-
tantly, each court should rigorously enforce its no-citation 
rule against itself, courts subject to their jurisdiction, and 
attorneys submitting briefs to either. A court's no-citation 
rule should apply not only to its own unpublished opinions 
but those of other courts. Enforcement could include the 
refusal to consider an unpublished opinion, the striking of a 
brief that includes the citation, or treating citation of an 
unpublished opinion as professional misconduct. 
If these proposals are adopted, the goals originally sought 
to be gained by restrictions on publication can be achieved, to 
the benefit of both the courts and those who must rely on 
them to correct error and to develop the law. 

